Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International
Journal
Volume 13
Issue 1 Revisiting the Life and Work of Raphaël
Lemkin

Article 12

4-2019

Raphaël Lemkin’s Derivation of Genocide from His Analysis of
Nazi-Occupied Europe
Raffael Scheck
Colby College

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp

Recommended Citation
Scheck, Raffael (2019) "Raphaël Lemkin’s Derivation of Genocide from His Analysis of Nazi-Occupied
Europe," Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 13: Iss. 1: 113-129.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.1.1584

Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol13/iss1/12
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal by an authorized editor of
Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Raphaël Lemkin’s Derivation of Genocide from His Analysis of Nazi-Occupied
Europe
Acknowledgements
I thank Hilary Earl, Doris Bergen, Douglas Irvin-Erickson, Benjamin Lieberman, and the journal's two
anonymous reviewers for comments and constructive criticism of an earlier version of this article. I also
thank my son Anselm Scheck for helping me search for Lemkin's memo to President Roosevelt. I am
especially grateful for the Audrey Wade Hittinger Katz and Sheldon Toby Katz endowed chair, which
allowed me to do the archival research for this project.

This article is available in Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol13/iss1/12

Raphaël Lemkin’s Derivation of Genocide from His Analysis of
Nazi-Occupied Europe
Raffael Scheck

Colby College
Waterville, Maine, USA

Popular understanding associates genocide with mass murder and connects it to the Holocaust,
specifically the mass murder of Jews during the Second World War. As Martin Shaw states: “Just
as Nazi anti-Jewish policy has been over-interpreted in terms of its final, exterminatory, phase,
so genocide generally has been narrowed to extermination.”1 Lemkin, however, defined genocide
much more broadly. In Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, he argued that the Nazi occupation destroyed
practically all subjected national or ethnic groups by attacking their culture, impoverishing them,
and lowering their birthrate, with physical destruction being only one possible course of action.
The mass murder of the Jews plays a surprisingly small role in Axis Rule. Lemkin did mention
violence against Jews, specifically in Poland, and he provided bits of information throughout the
book indicating that he was aware of the murderous Nazi policies against Jews, but he devoted
little analysis to the Europe-wide deportation and killing program.2 The breadth and complexity of
Lemkin’s definition has confused historians and international lawyers and provoked the criticism
that it is either too broad or too narrow.3
Recent research has helped to clarify the sources of Lemkin’s thinking and the development
of the genocide concept. A new biography by Douglas Irvin-Erickson traces the influence of the
national cultural autonomy thinking of Austrian Marxist thinkers Otto Bauer and Karl Renner
on Lemkin and shows that Lemkin’s concept of the nation as a “community of character” and
“family of mind” was more flexible than had been assumed.4 Martin Shaw provides a cogent
explanation for the confusion regarding the definition of genocide, showing that Lemkin’s original
broader definition experienced a severe narrowing in the United Nations Genocide Convention
(1948), which prompted many well-meaning but often confusing efforts by scholars to remedy
the shortcomings of this definition.5 Anton Weiss-Wendt highlights the Soviet Union’s role in
narrowing the definition of genocide during the negotiations, while also giving due attention to
the motives of other states such as a United States still practicing segregation and a Britain still
committed to its colonial empire.6 In a double biography of Lemkin and Jan Karski, the Polish
resister who testified to western governments about the mass murder of the Jews, French historian
Annette Becker stresses Lemkin’s role in alerting an incredulous western public to Nazi atrocities,
1

Martin Shaw, What is Genocide? 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015), 64. See also Jens Meierhenrich,
“Introduction: The Study and History of Genocide,” in Genocide: A Reader, ed. Jens Meierhenrich (Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 7 and 14-15.
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Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 21-22, 75-78, and 88-89.
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For good discussions of this confusion, see Eric D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton and
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), 8-9; Shaw, What is Genocide?, vii and 53-65; Dan Stone, “Raphaël Lemkin
on the Holocaust,” in The Origins of Genocide: Raphaël Lemkin as a Historian of Mass Violence, ed. Dominik J. Schaller
and Jürgen Zimmerer (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 96; A. Dirk Moses, “Raphaël Lemkin, Culture,
and the Concept of Genocide,” in The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 20-21 and 32-36; William Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime
of Crimes (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 25. But Schabas later says (wrongly in
my opinion) that for Lemkin, “genocide was above all meant to describe the destruction of the Jews.” (113). Schabas
does emphasize the broad range of Lemkin’s definition in his introduction to the new edition of Axis Rule, however:
William Schabas, “Introduction to the Second Edition by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.,” in Axis Rule in Occupied
Europe. Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress, ed. Raphaël Lemkin (Clark, NJ: The Lawbook
Exchange Ltd., 2014), x and xiv. Similarly: Samantha Powers, “Introduction to the First Edition,” in Axis Rule in
Occupied Europe. Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress, ed. Raphaël Lemkin (Clark, NJ: The
Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2014), xx-xxi.
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trying to overcome defensive reactions formed in response to the excesses of anti-German atrocity
propaganda from the Great War.7
This article takes a fresh look at the creation of the term genocide. My basic point is that we
need to keep in mind that Lemkin derived the concept from an analysis of a wide variety of Axis,
especially German, occupation regimes.8 I argue that the development of the concept (probably
between December 1942 and November 1943) was shaped by three factors. First, Lemkin shared a
peculiar understanding of the Nazi regime’s motives in the Second World War, namely the idea that
Hitler, by waging a war on foreign peoples rather than states, was cynically calculating that even
a militarily defeated Germany would dominate an impoverished and decimated Europe after the
war. German aggression was therefore for Lemkin not simply a war of conquest but more precisely
an attempt to carry out a demographic revolution for which a German military victory was not
absolutely necessary.9 Second, Lemkin’s thinking was influenced by the U.S. government agency
for which he worked at the time, the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW), which was later integrated
into the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA). This agency offered him great insights into the
economic exploitation of occupied areas with an eye to future restitution efforts, but it did not
focus on German atrocities. Third, Lemkin always remained focused on law, not policy. Resting his
case on legal documents offered two advantages to him: it proved to a doubtful American public
that Nazi cruelty and injustices were not war propaganda, and it provided the basis for the section
of the book concerned with “Proposals for Redress,” the last part of the subtitle. By identifying
German violations of the international law on occupations, mostly of the Hague Regulations
(1907), Lemkin could make a case for the introduction of new international laws on genocide and
on military occupations. On the other hand, the book’s legal focus obscured the most atrocious
Nazi crimes, which rarely proceeded according to published laws and decrees.
All of these factors colluded to create a very broad definition of genocide that contributed great
insights on the exploitation and repression of Axis-occupied Europe but did not highlight the most
atrocious Nazi policies and left confusion as to the general application of the new concept. When
Lemkin distributed the book to U.N. delegations in his campaign for an international law banning
genocide, some countries, for example the Soviet Union, therefore found it easy to interpret the
U.N. Genocide Convention primarily as a law against a future Nazi movement.10
The Concept of Genocide in Axis Rule
It is important to keep in mind that the three parts of the book came into being in reverse
chronological order. The oldest and by far largest component is Part III, which consists of translated
laws and decrees from Axis-occupied Europe. Lemkin had begun to collect these documents
during his appointment at the University of Stockholm, where he had found refuge in early 1940
following the German and Soviet conquest of Poland. When Lemkin received an invitation to
teach at Duke University and a visa to the United States, he packed this collection into a suitcase
and brought it with him in April 1941.11 His host at Duke, Professor Malcolm McDermott, took
7

Annette Becker, Messagers du désastre. Raphaël Lemkin, Jan Karski et les génocides (Paris: Fayard, 2018), esp. 98-109.
One would have to clarify, however, that Lemkin was a “messenger of disaster” in the sense that the disaster he
communicated was the Axis occupation of Europe, not specifically the Holocaust. In his address to the North Carolina
Bar Association in May 1942, for example, he focused on German manipulations of the courts in Poland and some
other occupied countries. He did not mention the Jews at all: Raphaël Lemkin, “Law and Lawyers in the European
Subjugated Countries,” in Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual Session of the North Carolina Bar Association, ed. Allston
Stubbs, 107-116 (Durham: Christian Printing, 1942).

8

Lemkin referred to Axis policies and duly analyzed Italian, Hungarian, Croatian, Slovak, Bulgarian, Romanian, and
Vichy French laws and decrees, but he believed that these policies followed the “German pattern.” Lemkin, Axis Rule,
3-4 and, for an example, 188.

9

Most scholars have paid little attention to this fact. Irvin-Erickson mentions it but discusses it mostly in the context
of Lemkin’s hopes to stop Nazi genocide during the war: Douglas Irvin-Erickson, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of
Genocide (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 136. See also William Korey, An Epitaph for Raphaël
Lemkin (New York: Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement Human Rights of the American Jewish Committee,
2001), 16-17.
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Irvin-Erickson, Lemkin, 167. Weiss-Wendt, The Soviet Union, 7 and 111.
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Lemkin to Washington D.C. and introduced him to John Vance, the law librarian of the Library of
Congress, who helped him find more Axis orders and decrees.12 Through Vance, Lemkin also met
Colonel Archibald King, who worked in the military government section of the War Department.
King attended some of Lemkin’s classes at Duke and expressed interest in Lemkin’s document
collection.13 Lemkin therefore translated his documents into English and used them as a looseleaf collection entitled “Military Government in Europe” in his courses at Duke and also for a
course at the War Department’s School of Military Government in Charlottesville, Virginia, in the
summer of 1942. The collection, which is organized alphabetically by occupied country, includes
no commentary and does not use the term genocide. Lemkin obviously understood it as a work in
progress; the pages were numbered in a way that allowed for additional laws to be inserted. The
collection includes some laws reprinted in Part III of Axis Rule, but it is thinner than the material
in Part III.14
Thanks to his document collection, Lemkin came to the attention of U.S. Government officials.
In June 1942, he was invited to work for the Board of Economic Warfare.15 While working at the
BEW, Lemkin completed an expanded version of his collection under the title “Key Laws, Decrees,
and Regulations Issued by the Axis in Europe” in December 1942. This version included brief
introductions to the occupation regimes of specific countries that resemble the sections of Part II in
Axis Rule, where Lemkin surveys Axis laws and decrees in each occupied country. In the preface
to this collection, Lemkin makes a distinction between countries where Germany tolerates some
form of collaborating regime or administration (western and northern Europe), those countries
where total subjugation is the aim (mostly Poland, the Soviet Union, and parts of Yugoslavia), and
territories incorporated (illegally annexed) into the Reich, such as Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg,
and western Poland. This collection contains more laws and decrees published in Part III of Axis
Rule and outlines of the analysis presented in Part II, but it still omits some occupied countries and
does not use the term genocide. Lemkin presented this manuscript to George Finch, the director
of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who agreed to publish it.16 Finch therefore
committed himself to publishing foremost an analysis and documentation of Axis occupation
regimes, which may explain why he did not mention the term genocide in his foreword to Axis
Rule, dated August 18, 1944.17
In the following eleven months, Lemkin finalized the manuscript for Axis Rule. He signed
the preface on November 15, 1943, and it appears that the manuscript was complete by that date
(although Lemkin inserted some new information later on). Yet, disputes between Lemkin and
his publisher delayed the publication of the book, so that it only came out a year later.18 To the
manuscript he had compiled in December 1942, Lemkin added sections on Greece (he received
detailed information on Greece only in the course of 1943 while working for the BEW), and he
expanded the section on Yugoslavia, which had previously focused only on Serbia. Given that
Greece and Yugoslavia were also subjected to non-German occupation regimes, Lemkin elaborated
on Italian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian occupation practices, and he presented new material on the
Romanian occupation of Soviet territory. He also expanded the legal discussion of the occupation
11

John Cooper, Raphaël Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015 [first 2008]), 34-35 and 46; Raphaël Lemkin, Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphaël Lemkin
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013), 76-77; Philippe Sands, East West Street: On the Origins of
“Genocide” and “Crimes Against Humanity” (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016), 168-173. The collection now rests in the
Raphaël Lemkin Papers, series I, boxes 1-3, in the Rare Books and Manuscript Library at Columbia University in New
York City.
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Lemkin, Totally Unofficial, 106-108.
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Ibid., 108-109.
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Raphaël Lemkin, “Military Government in Europe,” (University of North Carolina Law Library, 1942).
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Lemkin, Totally Unofficial, 112.
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Lemkin, Totally Unofficial, 116. The loose-leaf collection is available in a few libraries (including the law library of the
University of North Carolina) and in several record groups at the National Archives.
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George A. Finch, Foreword to Lemkin, Axis Rule, vii-viii.
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Irvin-Erickson, Lemkin, 81. The latest reference I found in the book refers to the first trials against German war criminals
in the Soviet Union in December 1943: Lemkin, Axis Rule, 237.

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.1.1584

Scheck

116

regimes in Part II. The most important addition was Part I, the shortest section of the book. It focuses
on German administration techniques and is organized by subject, not country. It synthesizes the
occupation practices described in Part II and documented in Part III, although it also introduces
some generic remarks about law in Nazi Germany and about measures applying to all occupied
countries. The chapters of Part I cover topics such as administration, police, law, courts, property,
finance, labor, and the legal status of the Jews. They draw from information Lemkin had compiled
for the BEW.19 Chapter 9 of Part I works like a synthesis of the previous chapters and is entitled
“Genocide;” it surveys eight different techniques of genocide and articulates recommendations
for the future. This chapter comprises only 16 pages, but it is the most widely read – together with
Lemkin’s Preface (7 pages), which introduces the term genocide.
The genocide chapter highlights Lemkin’s inclusive understanding of the term because it
subsumes all of the acts surveyed in the preceding chapters under eight genocidal policies, ranging
from political to social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral. Lemkin also
frequently uses the terms “genocide” or “genocidal” in the second and third parts of the book,
but only very rarely in connection to mass killings. For example, a section entitled “Genocide
and Resistance” in Part II describes German censorship and anti-Czech cultural policies in the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The chapter on Greece states, “a real genocide policy was
applied to the Greeks in the Aegean region” by the Bulgarian occupiers and explains: “Greek
churches and schools were closed and the Bulgarian language was made the official language.
These measures aimed at changes in the composition of the population in accordance with the
German pattern.”20 The sections on Norway highlight laws giving German citizenship to the
illegitimate children of German soldiers and Norwegian women. France is the focus of economic
exploitation and Germanization policies in Alsace-Lorraine. Lemkin cites the anti-Jewish laws of
the Vichy government and laws of the German Military Commander in France aiming to register
and expropriate Jews.
In Part III, the collection of laws, Lemkin devotes four pages to a sub-chapter entitled “Genocide
Legislation” in Luxemburg, listing various Germanization laws, ranging from compulsory name
changes to the teaching of German in schools and decrees favoring the Lutheran church. By
comparison, he devotes only three pages to genocide legislation in Poland (dealing only with
certain privileges for ethnic Germans in the General Government) and none on the occupied Soviet
territories.21 Lemkin often equates genocide with an assault on minority culture, as for example
in the Croatian law banning the Cyrillic alphabet in Croatian-occupied Bosnia, the Magyarization
policies in the Hungarian-occupied territories of Yugoslavia, and the German language policies in
Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, and the incorporated parts of Poland.22 Furthermore, he highlights
examples of forced population movements through economic pressure or deportation, as for
example in the parts of Greece incorporated by Bulgaria and, again, the German-annexed parts of
Poland.23
Lemkin includes all of these policies on the spectrum of genocide. His definition incorporates
a range of policies from relatively harmless measures such as the inclusion of foreigners with
German heritage into the German racial community to the physical destruction of unwanted
populations, particularly Jews. Within this spectrum, genocide applies to the repression of the
culture and language of occupied peoples and the imposition of the occupier’s culture and language
19

See, in particular, Raphäel Lemkin, “Civil Affairs Guides,” on the Nazi party, the courts, the police, and the SS, National
Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), RG 153 Judge Advocate General, Office of Economic
Warfare, Boxes 2 and 5, L-99.

20

Lemkin, Axis Rule, 188.

21

Ibid., 440-443, 552-555.

22

Mark Mazower argues that Lemkin remained wedded to the old principle of minority rights embedded in the Paris
peace treaties of 1919 that meant foremost to protect the language and culture of minorities in the new multi-ethnic
states of eastern central Europe. Mazower argues that Lemkin wanted to create an improved version of these
treaties in the form of the UN Genocide Convention. The cited passages confirm this impression: Mark Mazower,
No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2009), 129-130.

23

Lemkin, Axis Rule, 172-173, 188, 223-225, 245, 259-60, 262-264.
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(a phenomenon later called “cultural genocide”24); economic exploitation; forced labor; and the
deportation of native populations and the encouragement of settlement in the newly occupied
areas by members of the dominant nation (something we would call “ethnic cleansing” today
and that Lemkin sometimes called “colonization” in Axis Rule). Lemkin advocated a holistic view
of genocide even though he soon recognized that his eight categories were too complicated and
partly redundant, so that he reduced them to only three: physical, cultural, and biological.25 There
is another factor, however, that holds together the eight genocidal policies: Lemkin’s view of Nazi
goals in World War II.
Genocide as Demographic Revolution Regardless of Military Outcome
For Lemkin, all genocidal policies he outlined emanated from an overarching German intention to
massively change the demographic balance of Europe. He argued that all these policies were part of
a cynical scheme by the Nazi regime to ensure that Germany would win the war demographically
even if it lost militarily. As he writes in the preface to Axis Rule:
The picture of coordinated German techniques of occupation must lead to the conclusion
that the German occupant has embarked upon a gigantic scheme to change, in favor of
Germany, the balance of biological forces between it and the captive nations for many years
to come. The objective of this scheme is to destroy or to cripple the subjugated peoples in
their development so that, even in the case of Germany’s military defeat, it will be in a
position to deal with other European nations from the vantage point of numerical, physical,
and economic superiority. Despite the bombings of Germany, this German superiority will
be fully evident after hostilities have ceased and for many years to follow, when, due to the
present disastrous state of nourishment and health in the occupied countries, we shall see in
such countries a stunted post-war generation, survivors of the ill-fed children of these war
years.26

Lemkin returns to the same idea in the chapter on genocide, claiming that the Nazi scheme was
devised before the start of the war: “Thus the German people in the post-war period will be in a
position to deal with other European peoples from the vantage point of biological superiority. […]
In this respect genocide is a new technique of occupation aimed at winning the peace even though
the war itself is lost.”27 One may assume that the actual course of the war, especially the dogged
and very costly resistance of the German armed forces in the last months of the conflict, induced
Lemkin to revise this idea of a demographic revolution as the ultimate Nazi war aim regardless
of the military outcome. Yet, he repeated this notion in various papers and articles after the war.28
The origins of this notion are hard to trace. If one can believe Lemkin’s autobiography, he
mentioned it already in the spring of 1941 to Colonel Archibald King. After a discussion of German
violations of the Hague Regulations, Lemkin explained:

24

Although “cultural genocide” corresponded quite well to Lemkin’s definition of cultural, moral, and religious genocide,
he initially opposed using the term because he saw it as a plot of his enemies to squeeze out the destruction of
cultures from the planned U.N. Genocide Convention and to reduce genocide to mass killing. That is more or less
what ultimately happened, much to the chagrin of Lemkin: Irvin-Erickson, Lemkin, 176 and 182-189.

25

Thomas M. Butcher, “A ‘Synchronized Attack’: On Raphaël Lemkin’s Holistic Conception of Genocide,” Journal of
Genocide Research 15, no. 3 (2013).

26

Lemkin, Axis Rule, xi.

27

Ibid., 81.
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Raphaël Lemkin, “The Crime of Genocide” in Bulletin de la Commission internationale et pénitentiaire, vol. XII, 34-43,
n.d., with draft found in Raphaël Lemkin Papers, P-154, American Jewish Historical Society (hereafter AJHS), Box
5, Folder 3. See also: Raphaël Lemkin, “Genocide. A New International Crime. Punishment and Prevention,” Revue
internationale de droit pénal, (Paris, 1946), 360-370, with draft found in Raphaël Lemkin Papers, P-154, AJHS, Box
13, Folder 2, 363-364; Raphaël Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime Under International Law,” The American Journal of
International Law, 41, no. 1, January 1947, 147, with draft found in Raphaël Lemkin Papers, P-154, AJHS, Box 5, Folder
3.
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Hitler intends to change the whole population structure in Europe for a thousand years
– which means virtually forever. Certain races or nations will disappear completely or be
crippled indefinitely. Even in the case of German defeat, the Germans have it planned that
these remaining nations will have to lean on Germany to stay alive. The Germans are trying
to defeat and destroy not governments, but peoples.29

The reference to Hitler’s intention is based on a passage in the book Gespräche mit Hitler by former
Danzig Senate President Hermann Rauschning, published in Zürich in 1940. In Axis Rule, Lemkin
cites the English translation that appeared in New York the same year. The relevant passage
reflects a statement by Hitler: “We shall have to develop a technique of depopulation. If you
ask me what I mean by depopulation, I mean the removal of entire racial units.” Further down,
Hitler allegedly explains that he would seek to decrease the high birth rate of Slavic populations
through unbloody methods such as prolonged separation of men and women. Lemkin did not
know this, but Rauschning is now considered a dubious source who exaggerated his closeness to
Hitler and reported many expressions by Hitler as verbatim that he likely did not hear in personal
conversation with him.30
The notion that Nazi occupation meant a deadly chokehold on European countries, and that
Nazi Germany was using occupations to carry out a demographic revolution, was present in
American public discourse during the war. For example, a New York Times article from March 10,
1942, entitled “Death under the New Order,” spells out some ideas that shape Axis Rule. Focusing
on the civilian deaths resulting from the war, the article draws attention to the demographic loss
created by the separation of men and women from occupied countries, implying what Lemkin
would later call biological and economic genocide: “Hitler is just as surely murdering the French
when he keeps more than 1,500,000 war prisoners away from their families as he is when he shoots
hostages or takes milk and eggs away from children.” The article further observes: “’Life-room’
[Lebensraum] for these Nazi gorillas means death-room for other people. Murder by starvation,
by overwork, by deprivation of medical care, by systematic abuse would make a Nazi peace as
destructive as a Nazi war – even more destructive, because the Nazis could then proceed without
interruption.” After alluding to similar policies by Japan, the article concludes: “The Axis system
may be precisely defined as a system of death.”31 The article also reflects the widespread notion
in America that Jews were just one of many persecuted groups, an opinion that failed to grasp the
viciousness and particularity of Nazi policies against the Jews.32
The idea that Nazi Germany would win the peace through a demographic victory regardless
of the military outcome rests on two related implications that Lemkin never spelled out. First, it
only made sense if German losses remained low in comparison to the losses inflicted by Germany
on its enemies and on civilians in the occupied countries. Second, the defeat of Germany and the
transition to peace would have to come in a relatively smooth manner that would not lead to
the destruction of the German nation by the victorious Allies. In Axis Rule and in other wartime
documents, Lemkin cites no numbers of German deaths and does not reveal how he expects the
war to end. It was known that German losses had been relatively low before the attack on the Soviet
Union, but they massively increased thereafter.33 In the American press, exaggerated Soviet figures
29

Lemkin, Totally Unofficial, 109. He wrote a very similar passage in his handwritten draft for the autobiography: New
York Public Library, Manuscripts and Archives Division, Microfilm, Reel 2, Notebooks, 24a and 25.

30

Hermann Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction (New York: Putnam, 1940), 138. Lemkin, Axis Rule, 81. Ian Kershaw,
echoing earlier work by Theodor Schieder, warns against using Rauschning’s work as a verbatim source of what
Hitler actually said but admits that “there is nothing in it which is not consonant with what is otherwise known of
Hitler’s character and opinions.” Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 5th ed.
(London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 182.

31

“Death under the New Order,” New York Times (1923-Current file), March 10, 1942,18. My student Huan Bui brought
this article to my attention.

32

Richard Breitman et al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 11. (I owe this
reference to my student Jonah Carter.) See also Laurel Leff, Buried by the Times: The Holocaust and America’s Most
Important Newspaper (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3.
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of German deaths stood next to excessively low German estimates.34 Lemkin clearly did not foresee
the extremely bloody last phase of the war, nor did he anticipate the large wave of retaliatory violence
against German civilians and POWs in Soviet hands before and after the German surrender, which
increased the German death toll.35 Even though more than half of the German losses occurred after
Lemkin had completed the book manuscript (from mid-July 1944 to May 1945), it is surprising
that he did not expect a bloodier end to the war. Lemkin professed to have read Mein Kampf and
therefore knew about the fanaticism and Social Darwinism inherent in Hitler’s ideology, although
his reading of Rauschning suggests that he might also have been influenced by a more nihilistic
and opportunistic view of Hitler. As Dan Stone explains, Lemkin understood Hitler’s fanaticism
but at the same time tended to see Hitler’s ideology, like Rauschning, as a way to a means, the
forging of national unity, not as an end in itself.36
Many German policies, in particular the Germanization measures, would certainly not have
survived a German defeat. The forced resettlement policies could be (and were) turned back, and
even during the war it proved difficult to motivate ethnic Germans to settle in the areas of Poland
and Slovenia they were supposed to colonize.37 Yet, the notion that Nazi Germany was waging a
demographic war regardless of the outcome of the military conflict explains why policies such as
the granting of German citizenship to Norwegian babies or the ridiculous Germanization of names
in Luxemburg occupy so much room in Axis Rule.
Lemkin’s Work in the Board of Economic Warfare
A second factor influencing the development of the concept “genocide” was Lemkin’s every-day
work on the BEW. Nobody has analyzed yet what exactly Lemkin did inside the BEW and how his
work may have influenced his understanding of Nazi occupation policies and genocide.38 The BEW,
formed in April 1942 out of the Economic Defense Board, focused on import and export controls,
aiming to maximize the allocation of resources for the U.S. and its allies while trying to prevent
the Axis powers from acquiring resources in neutral countries. The young Arthur Schlesinger Jr.,
later an eminent historian, considered applying for a position on the BEW, whose work he believed
to be attractive and exciting: “People were rushing around doing things – imposing blockades,
buying up scarce raw metals, blacklisting Axis-controlled firms, plotting to deny the enemy
strategic materials.”39 But other observers and historians have characterized the BEW as a toothless
outgrowth of President Roosevelt’s misguided desire to create new war agencies with overlapping
competencies.40 For political scientist Donald G. Stevens, the BEW was largely an attempt by its
33
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chairman, Vice President Henry A. Wallace, to create a stronger power base for the vice presidency.
Embattled by competing agencies and conservative Congressmen who suspected Wallace of trying
to project New Deal policies onto the global sphere, the BEW was dissolved in June 1943 by an
executive order from Roosevelt.41 Its personnel and functions migrated to the Office of Economic
Warfare, which was itself integrated into the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) in September
1943.42
Given the institutional instability of the BEW and its successors, it is difficult to find Lemkin’s
traces in these agencies despite a remarkable continuity of personnel.43 The archival documentation
suggests that he occupied a rather low rung in the hierarchy of this agency. The BEW contained six
principal offices, some of which were divided into so-called branches. The eleven branches were
themselves sub-divided into divisions. Lemkin worked first in the British Empire division (until
9 December 1942)44 and then in the “Reoccupation Division” (sometimes listed as “Reoccupation
and Reconstruction Division”) of the “Blockade and Supply” branch, which itself belonged to the
“Office of Economic Warfare Analysis.” He did not head the “Reoccupation Division,” nor was he
present at the top-level meetings of the BEW.45 Lemkin was hired as a perdiem “chief consultant”
with a pay of $18.05 per day (approximately $285 in 2018 value) not to exceed 180 days per year.46
In describing his work, a personnel manager at the BEW stated:
Dr. Lemkin is engaged in preparing an annotated collection of key laws (in translation) issued
by the Axis in German-Occupied Europe. This collection… is essential for determination
of laws to be cancelled or reviewed prior to Allied occupation. Dr. Lemkin, who is an
outstanding international lawyer, is engaged in analysis of these laws and in recommending
policy to be adopted with regard to them… His extensive knowledge of Europe and his very
specialized knowledge of the problems of military government – he is a recognized authority
on this subject – make him essential to the work of the Reoccupation and Reconstruction
Division of the Board of Economic Warfare.47
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In the “Reoccupation Division,” which was renamed “Economic Institutions Staff” in 1944, Lemkin
worked on questions of government, administration, economics, and law in Nazi Europe, with
special attention to the occupied countries. His boss, Allen R. Rosenberg, requested reports on special
themes every Monday (by noon), and these reports likely provided the information for guidebooks
on Nazi-occupied Europe that the “Reoccupation Division” produced and updated every couple
of months. The guidebooks then were sent to the military and to other agencies interested in the
occupied or liberated territories.48 The archives of the “Reoccupation Division” contain studies
on specific occupied countries, the so-called “Civil Affairs Guides,” as well as studies on generic
aspects of the Axis-occupied areas. Most of the “Civil Affairs Guides” and thematic studies refer to
laws and decrees that Lemkin had collected and that he published in Axis Rule. One guidebook, for
example, analyzes the way in which the German police and the SS expanded their administrative
power beyond the Reich and helped to control and exploit occupied Europe. This text mirrors the
chapter on the German police and SS in Axis Rule.49 The guidebooks are all rigorously crafted and
reflect great legal and economic expertise. Although they do not list an author, Lemkin’s authorship
is extremely likely because the note from the personnel manager cited above mentions that he was
charged with producing informational manuals on occupied Europe and because the guidebooks
clearly draw from his source material and reflect his interpretations of German policies without,
however, using the term genocide.50
The work of the Reoccupation Division had implications for other government services. As
the Allied forces began to liberate occupied areas, the information on Nazi laws and exploitation
mechanisms gathered by the Reoccupation Division became relevant for post-liberation
administrations and for the restitution of robbed property, a major concern of the BEW/FEA and also
of Axis Rule.51 The Reoccupation Division therefore cooperated with the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS) and with the military agencies concerned with administering and reconstructing the former
occupied territories.52 Lemkin’s work was also relevant for the agencies concerned with future
war crimes trials because his documentation provided material for postwar trials and restitution
arrangements. His collection of Axis laws and decrees from December 1942 wandered into the
archives of the Judge Advocate General, the War Department, and the FEA. Lemkin produced a
supplementary volume on Greece in June 1943, which he also integrated into Axis Rule.53
It was therefore not the case, as one of his biographers has suggested, that Lemkin turned
to Axis Rule in the evenings after coming home from the office: Lemkin’s daily work consisted
precisely of the study of Nazi occupation policies.54 His role as counselor in the BEW focused
on legal and economic matters and appealed to two areas in which Lemkin was already an
internationally recognized expert before the war: constitutional law and currency exchange. Lemkin
had participated in the drafting of the Polish penal law code in the 1920s, and he had written bookbefore July 1943, and it mentions the Reoccupation and Reconstruction Division, which Lemkin had joined on
December 9, 1942.
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length analyses on the legal system of Fascist Italy and of the Soviet Union. As a financial expert,
he had published a book in French and one in Swedish on currency exchange before traveling
to America.55 Clearly, this knowledge helped him for example to explain how German currency
policies in occupied France were draining the local economy, a phenomenon he also characterized
as genocide.56 But while Lemkin was analyzing the myriad ways in which German policies helped
to exploit occupied territories and violated the Hague Regulations, his work at the BEW only rarely
touched on the mass deportations of Jews and the fate of the deported after arrival.
What did Lemkin know about the Europe-wide deportation and mass murder of the Jews?
In Axis Rule, he highlights the expropriation of Jews, which was more visible in decrees than
the mass murder.57 Yet he clearly was aware of the Nazis’ murderous policies. For example, he
points out starvation rations in the Polish ghettos and occasional massacres, and he mentions a
Gestapo chief who “organized the liquidation of the ghettos in Polish towns, with the physical
annihilation of half a million inhabitants of the Warsaw ghetto.” He mentions murder of Jews with
the help of gas chambers, electrocution, and “death in the so-called death trains by the action of
quick-lime.”58 He also refers to the deportation of Jews from France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Norway to Poland, where they were treated in the same way as Polish Jews. In a footnote, he
even acknowledges the escape of approximately one thousand Jews from Denmark to Sweden in
August 1943.59 In the genocide chapter, he correctly sums up Hitler’s intentions (although not the
fact that they had been largely realized): “Some groups – such as the Jews – have to be destroyed
completely.”60 Lemkin’s information on these facts came predominantly from publications of the
Polish government-in-exile in London, especially the periodical Polish Fortnightly Review. The
Civil Affairs Guides Lemkin created for the BEW feature similar information. For example, the
Civil Affairs Guide on Poland from November 11, 1943, mentions the liquidation of the ghettos and
claims that of 1.75 million Jews in the General Government of Poland, at most 300,000 are estimated
to be alive.61
Lemkin therefore had a fairly accurate picture of Nazi policies on Jews. Unlike many
contemporary commentators in America, he understood that the Nazis targeted the Jews in far
more extreme ways than others (therefore he devoted a separate chapter to Jews). But he did not
highlight the systematic extermination policy against the Jews. His official focus on economic and
legal matters, as required by his daily work for the BEW, influenced his way of presenting the
mechanics of Nazi-occupied Europe. In Axis Rule, he consistently clung to an economic and legal
emphasis in elucidating Nazi policies, a tendency that obscured the focus on mass murder. The
economic and legal focus of the BEW clearly colors the bulk of Axis Rule.
The Emphasis on the Law
In the third part of my argument, I would like to examine Lemkin’s focus on law.62 We know
that his analysis of Nazi-occupied Europe rested on a collection of legal documents from Nazi
Europe. These laws and decrees were issued mostly by German military commanders, governors,
and civilian administrators in the occupied territories during the first months of the occupation.
Using this collection for an analysis of Nazi-occupied Europe, as Lemkin did, involves two risks.
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First, as every historian knows, normative texts may not be a good representation of actual
practices. Although Lemkin did not write as a historian, he likely was aware of this pitfall because
he had himself criticized a 1935 Nazi law on analogy – a law that stipulated that a person could be
punished for an act that was not itself illegal but resembled an existing crime.63 Although Lemkin
did not cite the book of German émigré Ernst Fraenkel, who defined the Nazi state as a “dual state”
with a more traditional normative branch and an arbitrary prerogative branch,64 he knew that Nazi
policies could go beyond stated legal practices. He devoted a special section in Axis Rule to the
arbitrary terror of the SS and Gestapo in occupied countries.65
Second, the bulk of the orders come from the first two years of the war and, generally, the
beginning of the occupation regimes (for example most decrees for Yugoslavia date from the first
three months of the occupation, April to July 194166). Although Axis Rule refers to events as late as
December 1943, it contains very few orders and decrees issued later than the first trimester of 1942.
These orders do not reflect the harsher practices of the later occupation years, when resistance
activities and German need for manpower and raw materials had sharply increased. The survey
in the magisterial Germany and the Second World War, edited by the German Military Research
Institute, therefore devotes separate sections to the early and the late periods of occupation, 19391941 and 1942-1944/45, respectively.67
Lemkin’s reliance on laws and decrees was likely reinforced by the difficulties he experienced
in convincing his audiences and colleagues of German atrocities, as he suggests in the preface to
Axis Rule.
For the outside world they [the laws and decrees] provide undeniable and objective evidence
regarding the treatment of subjugated peoples of Europe by the Axis powers. The author
feels that such evidence is especially necessary for the Anglo-Saxon reader, who, with his
innate respect for human rights and human personality, may be inclined to believe that the
Axis régime could not possibly be as cruel and ruthless as it has been hitherto described.68

In his autobiography, Lemkin reports that his American audiences, to whom he revealed some of
his ideas about Nazi practices, could not believe the ruthlessness of German occupation policies.
He noted the same reaction inside the BEW; his colleagues did not outright deny the atrocities
but doubted that the news would be believed and taken seriously. Some colleagues dismissively
pointed to World War I atrocity propaganda. Although Lemkin received an audience with Vice
President Wallace and talked to him again at a dinner party, he felt that he could not dent Wallace’s
fundamental optimism about human nature that made it impossible for Wallace to understand
Nazi cruelty.69
Through a mediator, Lemkin even contacted Eleanor Roosevelt and received permission
to submit a one-page memorandum to the President, in which he allegedly highlighted Nazi
atrocities and encouraged Roosevelt to issue a stern warning to Hitler and to work for the adoption
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of an international law against occupation crimes. But Lemkin claims to have received only a noncommittal response, stating that Roosevelt was aware of the problems and that a warning would
be forthcoming at the right time. In his autobiography, Lemkin points out that he therefore decided
to bring the information he had to the American people by using his collection of Nazi laws and
decrees for the occupied territories as incontrovertible evidence.70
Aside from proving genocidal occupation practices, Lemkin’s focus on the law also served his
aim to improve international law. Axis Rule documents many violations of the Hague Regulations
by Germany, and one of the two major proposals Lemkin made in the book is the creation of an
international oversight mechanism similar to the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War (1929).71
In analogy to the delegations from neutral countries visiting POW camps, Lemkin wanted neutral
delegations to visit occupied areas and ensure a legal and humane treatment of their civilian
populations. This proposal may sound promising, but Lemkin falsely implied that the POW regime
in World War II was following international law – the Geneva Convention and, for those countries
who had not ratified it, the Hague Regulations of 1907. He was oblivious to the atrocious treatment
of Soviet POWs by Nazi Germany and never mentioned the harsh and illegal treatment of Polish
POWs, which occurred despite the fact that Poland, unlike the Soviet Union, had ratified the
Geneva Convention. While the Geneva Convention remained the basis for the German treatment
of western POWs, Lemkin did not consider the many ways in which Nazi authorities stretched and
abused some of its provisions.72
The demand for tighter legal provisions regarding occupations was related to Lemkin’s desire
to see adoption of an international law against genocide in war and peace.73 He repeatedly pointed
out that he had made a similar proposal without using the term genocide at the Fifth International
Conference for the Unification of Penal Law in Madrid in October 1933. He had drafted a special
report proposing the codification of two new crimes that he called “vandalism” and “barbarity”
(originally in this order). Vandalism denoted the destruction of artworks and cultural institutions
in peace and in war, and barbarity meant acts of aggression against a defenseless population,
including massacres and pogroms, but also acts of humiliation and discrimination.74 Lemkin’s
proposals included a clause on universal jurisdiction, the notion that perpetrators of these new
crimes could be tried anywhere in the world and not just in the country where they had committed
them, and he reminded readers in Axis Rule that the prosecution of Nazi war criminals would be
much easier had his suggestions been adopted before the war.75
In a speech to the North Carolina Bar Association in May 1942, Lemkin even claimed that
adoption of his Madrid proposals would have helped to prevent the war. He told his audience that
he had read his proposals in Madrid and that the German delegation had left the room in protest.76
The minutes of the conference, however, do not list Lemkin, nor do they list a German delegation.
In his autobiography, Lemkin admitted that he had not attended the conference, allegedly because
he had received a phone call from the chairman of the Polish delegation who told him that the
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Minister of Justice opposed Lemkin’s presence in Madrid. Lemkin hinted that an anti-Semitic
paper had attacked his proposal as a selfish defense of the Jewish race and not as an initiative in
the interest of the Polish state. Polish historian Ryszard Szawlowski casts doubt on this explanation
and claims that there is no evidence for it in the archives of the Polish Foreign Ministry.77 In any
case, Lemkin kept attending international law conferences after Madrid, although usually not as a
member of the Polish delegation. For example, he presented a report on terrorism in Copenhagen
in 1935 and a paper on the role of law in the protection of international peace in Paris in 1937,
neither of which mentioned vandalism and barbarity.78 Lemkin’s idea to define vandalism and
barbarity as new international crimes did not garner much attention at the time, and his thinking
was still in flux. The breadth of policies that he defined as genocidal in Axis Rule indicates that
genocide is more than just an amalgam of vandalism and barbarity.79 It is a matter of dispute
whether Lemkin hoped that Axis Rule and an international law against genocide, adopted already
during the war, would help to stop Nazi atrocities (my sense is that Lemkin may have shared this
hope at some time but that it was not relevant any more when he finished the manuscript).80 But he
certainly put high hopes in a postwar international treaty reviving his 1933 proposal, and Axis Rule
was meant to be a legal resource informing negotiations to that end.
Conclusion
The breadth and complexity of Lemkin’s definition of “genocide” results from several influences
during the time he developed the concept. One of them is a belief that Nazi Germany was
engineering a demographic revolution that would leave Germany predominant in Europe
regardless of the outcome of the military conflict. This notion facilitated the assumption of a
coherent cynical motivation behind disparate policies, laws, and decrees. It ascribed a primarily
demographic motivation to the exploitation of foreign labor, for example, while downplaying the
need for labor in order to win the war. This notion also assumed that the cultural policies and
population exchanges initiated by the Nazi regime would somehow survive the end of the war
even if Germany lost and that the defeat of Nazi Germany would occur relatively smoothly and
with little bloodshed for Germany. Second, Lemkin’s daily work at the BEW reinforced his focus on
economic and legal matters and helps to explain why they occupy such a prominent place in Axis
Rule. His job provided Lemkin with good access to information and encouraged a detailed analysis
of Nazi occupation techniques, but it prioritized economic exploitation over atrocities, with a view
to restitution after the liberation of the occupied territories. Third, Lemkin’s focus on the law and
his belief in its curative effect, although already evident before the war, was reinforced by his
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78
Raphaël Lemkin, La Protection de la paix par le droit pénal. Rapport présenté au IVe Congrès international de Droit pénal
(Paris, July 26-31, 1937) (Paris: Marchal et Billard, 1938). In his report for the Madrid conference (in the original
version), Lemkin had discussed terrorism at length but concluded that it normally is already covered by national
laws and does not make much sense as a crime causing international harm. His report at the Copenhagen conference
disagrees. Raphaël Lemkin, “Terrorisme, rapport,” in VIème Conférence internationale pour l’unification du droit pénal
(Copenhagen, 1935), ed. August Goll, et al. (Paris: Pedone, 1938).
79
It is a matter of debate whether genocide represents a radically new concept. Lemkin said in Axis Rule: “New
conceptions require new terms.” (79). Yet, he also argued that genocide was an amalgam of barbarity and vandalism
(91). For more specific information on this debate, see Irvin-Erickson, Lemkin, 82-84, and Anson Rabinbach, “The
Challenge of the Unprecedented- Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide,” Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook 4
(2005).
80
See Irvin-Erickson, Lemkin, who argues for this notion, whereas Korey argues against it in Korey, Short Titles, 17. In
Totally Unofficial, Lemkin claimed that he hoped that an international treaty might still save at least “a part of the
people,” but the date of this reflection is unclear, Raphaël Lemkin, Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphaël
Lemkin, edited by Donna-Lee Frieze (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013), 114. It likely was late 1942
– following Lemkin’s meetings with Wallace.
77
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desire to prove German violations to a hesitant American public and by his hope to contribute to a
legal condemnation of genocide in all of its forms after the war. This focus favored Nazi violations
of international law that could be proven through legal texts and therefore encouraged a broad
definition of genocidal acts while obscuring the most heinous crimes.
Acknowledgements
I thank Hilary Earl, Doris Bergen, Douglas Irvin-Erickson, Benjamin Lieberman, and the journal’s
two anonymous reviewers for comments and constructive criticism of an earlier version of this
article. I also thank my son Anselm Scheck for helping me search for Lemkin’s memo to President
Roosevelt. I am especially grateful for the Audrey Wade Hittinger Katz and Sheldon Toby Katz
endowed chair, which allowed me to do the archival research for this project.
Bibliography
Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation. My Years in the State Department. New York: Norton, 1969.
“Allen R. Rosenberg to Division and Section Heads.” September 2, 1944. National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 169, Foreign Economic Administration, Washington, DC,
United States. Entry 216, Box 1137.
Becker, Annette. Messagers du désastre: Raphaël Lemkin, Jan Karski et les génocides. Paris: Fayard, 2018.
Bessel, Richard. Germany 1945: From War to Peace. New York: Harper Collins, 2009.
Betty Hight Papers. FDR Presidential Library, Hyde Park, NY, United States.
Breitman, Richard, Norman Goda, Timothy Naftali, and Robert Wolfe. U.S. Intelligence and the
Nazis. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. https://doi.org/10.3138/cjh.41.1.163
Butcher, Thomas M. “A ‘Synchronized Attack’: On Raphaël Lemkin’s Holistic Conception of
Genocide.” Journal of Genocide Research 15, no. 3 (2013), 253-271.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2013.821221
Cooper, John. Raphaël Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention. Basingstoke and New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015 [first 2008].
“Death under the New Order.” New York Times (1923-Current file), March 10,1942.
Derks, Scott. The Value of A Dollar: Prices and Incomes in the United States from 1860 to 2009. Armenia:
Grey House Publishers, 2009.
Douglas, Ray M. Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2012.
Elder, Tanya. “What You See Before Your Eyes: Documenting Raphaël Lemkin’s Life by Exploring
His Archival Papers, 1900-1959.” In The Origins of Genocide: Raphaël Lemkin as a Historian of
Mass Violence, edited by Dominik J. Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer, 25-55. London and New
York: Routledge, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520500349910
Ernst, Daniel R. “The Ideal and the Actual in the State: William Hurst at the Board of Economic
Warfare.” In Total War and the Law: The American Home Front in World War II, edited by
Daniel R. Ernst and Victor Jew, 149-183. Westport: Praeger, 2002.
Foreign Economic Administration. Report to Congress on Operations of the Foreign Economic
Administration. September 25, 1944. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing
Office, 1944.
Fraenkel, Ernst. The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship. Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 1941.
Fritz, Stephen. Endkampf: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Death of the Third Reich. Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/110.2.570
Fritzsche, Peter. An Iron Wind: Europe under Hitler. New York: Basic Books, 2016.
Helton, H. Stephen. Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Foreign Economic Administration.
Washington, DC: The National Archives, 1951.
“Investigation A.” November 17, 1942. Raphaël Lemkin, personnel files, Board of Economic
Warfare, National Personnel Records Center, Saint Louis, Missouri, United States.
Irvin-Erickson, Douglas. Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-017-0475-1

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.1.1584

Lemkin’s Derivation of Genocide

127

Kershaw, Ian. The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 5th ed. London:
Bloomsbury, 2015.
Koistinen, Paul A.C. Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940-1945,
Modern War Studies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004.
Korey, William. An Epitaph for Raphaël Lemkin. New York: Jacob Blaustein Institute for the
Advancement Human Rights of the American Jewish Committee, 2001.
Leff, Laurel. Buried by the Times: The Holocaust and America’s Most Important Newspaper. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Lemkin, Raphaël. “Akte der Barbarei und des Vandalismus als delicta juris gentium.” Internationales
Anwaltsblatt 19, no. 6 (1933), 117-119.
----------. “Autobiography Draft.” n.d. Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library,
New York City, United States. Microfilm, Reel 2, Notebooks, 24a and 25.
----------. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for
Redress. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944.
----------. “Civil Affairs Guides.” On the Nazi party, the courts, the police, and the SS. National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 153 Judge Advocate General, Office of Economic
Warfare, Washington, DC, United States of America. National Archives and Records
Administration, Washington, DC, United States of America. Boxes 2 and 5, L-99.
----------. “Dr. Raphaël Lemkin’s Material.” Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy), RG 125,
General Records, 1945-1949, Washington, DC, United States. Entry A1-13. NAID 16465283.
----------. “Genocide. A New International Crime. Punishment and Prevention.” Revue internationale
de droit pénal. Paris, 1946. 360-370. Raphaël Lemkin Papers, P-154, American Jewish
Historical Society, New York City, United States. Box 13, Folder 2.
----------. “German Military Government Over Europe 1939-1943 Methods and Organization of
Nazi Controls. German Military and Police Tribunals in Occupied Territories.” October
25, 1943. National Archives and Records Administration, Judge Advocate General Law
Library, 1944-1949, Washington, DC, United States. Entry 135, Box 5.
----------. La Protection de la paix par le droit pénal. Rapport présenté au IVe Congrès international de
Droit pénal (Paris, July 26-31, 1937). Paris: Marchal et Billard, 1938.
----------. La Réglementation des paiements internationaux. Traité de droit comparé sur les dévises, le clearing
et les accords de paiements, les conflits des lois. Paris: A. Pedone, 1939.
----------. “Law and Lawyers in the European Subjugated Countries.” In Proceedings of the FortyFourth Annual Session of the North Carolina Bar Association, edited by Allston Stubbs, 107-16.
Durham: Christian Printing, 1942.
----------. Les actes constituant un danger général (interétatique) considérés comme délits de droits des gens.
Paris: Pedone, 1935.
----------. “Letter to Eleanor Roosevelt.” February 1, 1950. Raphaël Lemkin Papers, P-154, American
Jewish Historical Society, New York City, NY, United States. Box 2, Folder 3.
----------. “Military Government in Europe.” Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Law Library,
1942.
----------. “Rapport et projet de textes présentés par M. Raphaël Lemkin.” In Ve Conférence
internationale pour l’unification du droit pénal: Actes de la conférence, edited by Manuel LopezRey Arrojo, 48-56. Paris: Pedone, 1935.
----------. “Terrorisme, rapport.” In VIème Conférence Internationale pour l’unification du droit péna
(Copenhagen 1935), edited by August Goll, Vespasien Pella, Charles Bonca Ingwersen and
Henrik Emil Sachs. Paris: Pedone, 1938.
----------. “The Crime of Genocide.” In Bulletin de la Commission internationale et pénitentiaire, vol. XII,
34-43. n.d. Raphaël Lemkin Papers, P-154, American Jewish Historical Society, New York
City, United States. Box 5, Folder 3.
----------. Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphaël Lemkin. Edited by Donna-Lee Frieze. New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013.
----------. Valutareglering och clearing: Bearbetat efter Författarens Föreläsningar vid Stockholms Högskola
Hösten 1940. Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1941.

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.1.1584

Scheck

128

Loeffler, James. “Becoming Cleopatra: The Forgotten Zionism of Raphaël Lemkin.” Journal of
Genocide Research 19, no. 3 (2017), 340-60. https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2017.1349645
Lowe, Keith. Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II. New York: St. Martin’s, 2012.
Mazower, Mark. Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe. New York: Penguin, 2008.
----------. No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
Meierhenrich, Jens. “Introduction: The Study and History of Genocide.” In Genocide: A Reader,
edited by Jens Meierhenrich, 3-55. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, ed. Germany and the Second World War: Volume 5: Organization
and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.
Moses, A. Dirk. “Raphaël Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide.” In The Oxford Handbook
of Genocide Studies, edited by Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, 19-41. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010.
Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch. “German Military Government Over
Europe 1939-1943. Methods and Organization of Nazi Controls. General Government
(Poland).” November 11, 1943. National Archives and Records Administration, Judge
Advocate General Law Library, 1944-1949, Washington, DC, United States. Entry 135, Box
5.
Overmans, Rüdiger. Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte.
Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1524/9783486594140
----------. “Die Kriegsgefangenenpolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1939 bis 1945.” In Das Deutsche Reich
und der Zweite Weltkrieg, edited by Jörg Echternkamp, 729-875. Munich: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 2005.
Pauer-Studer, Herlinde. “Einleitung.” In Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts. Das Rechtsdenken im
Nationalsozialismus, edited by Herlinde Pauer-Studer and Julian Fink, 15-135. Berlin:
Suhrkamp, 2014.
Powers, Samantha. “Introduction to the First Edition.” In Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Laws of
Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress, by Raphaël Lemkin, xvii-xxiii.
Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2014.
Rabinbach, Anson. “The Challenge of the Unprecedented - Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of
Genocide.” Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook 4 (2005), 397-420.
Rauschning, Hermann. The Revolution of Nihilism. Warning to the West. Translated by E.W. Dickes.
New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1939.
----------. The Voice of Destruction. New York: Putnam, 1940.
“Recommendation to the Personnel Officer.” December 9, 1942. Raphaël Lemkin, personnel files,
Board of Economic Warfare, National Personnel Records Center, Saint Louis, MO, United
States.
Reoccupation Division. “Guide Books.” National Archives and Records Administration, RG 169,
Foreign Economic Administration, Washington, DC, United States. Entry 216, Box 1137.
“Request for Occupational Deferment.” Late 1942/ early 1943. Raphaël Lemkin, personnel files,
Board of Economic Warfare, National Personnel Records Center, Saint Louis, MO, United
States.
“Request for Occupational Deferment.” n.d. Raphaël Lemkin, personnel files of the Board of
Economic Warfare, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC,
United States.
Sands, Philippe. East West Street: On the Origins of “Genocide” and “Crimes Against Humanity”. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016.
Schabas, William. Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes. Cambridge, UK and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
----------. “Introduction to the Second Edition by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.” In Axis Rule in
Occupied Europe. Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress, by Raphaël
Lemkin, vii-xvi. Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2014.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. A Life in the Twentieth Century. Innocent Beginnings, 1917-1950. Boston and
New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000.

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.1.1584

Lemkin’s Derivation of Genocide

129

Stevens, Donald G. “Organizing for Economic Defense: Henry Wallace and the Board of Economic
Warfare’s Policy Initiatives, 1942.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 26, no. 4 (1996), 1126-1139.
Stone, Dan. “Raphaël Lemkin on the Holocaust.” Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 4 (2005): 539-550.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520500349985
----------. “Raphaël Lemkin on the Holocaust.” In The Origins of Genocide: Raphaël Lemkin as a Historian
of Mass Violence, edited by Dominik J. Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer, 95-106. London and
New York: Routledge, 2009.
Stubbs, Allston, ed. Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual Session of the North Carolina Bar Association.
Durham: Christian Printing, 1942.
Szawlowski, Richard. “Raphaël Lemkin’s Life Journey: From Creative Legal Scholar and Well-to-do
Lawyer in Warsaw until 1939 to Pinnacle of International Achievements during the 1940s
in the United States, Ending Penniless Crusader in New York in the 1950s.” In Rafal Lemkin:
A Hero of Humankind, edited by Bienczyl-Missala. Agnieszka and Slawomir Debski, 31-57.
Warsaw: The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2010.
Szawlowski, Ryszard. “Raphaël Lemkin (1900-1959). The Polish Lawyer Who Created the Concept
of ‘Genocide’.” The Polish Quarterly for International Affairs no. 2 (2005), 99-134.
Wallace, Henry A. The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973.
Weiss-Wendt, Anton. The Soviet Union and the Gutting of the UN Genocide Convention. Critical Human
Rights. Madison and London: University of Wisconsin Press, 2017.
Weitz, Eric D. A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2003.

©2019

Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.1.1584

